Coordinating to Eradicate Animal Disease, and the Role of Insurance Markets

Coordinating to Eradicate Animal Disease, and the Role of Insurance Markets
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协调消除动物疾病以及保险市场的作用

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发表时间:
2007
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通讯作者:
D. Hennessy
D. Hennessy
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
D. Hennessy

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传统上,畜牧生产是一个分散的部门。与根除传染病有关的生物安全行动一般是非可收缩性的,如果它们是可收缩性的,可能涉及异常高的交易成本。如果要在一个区域内根除一种地方病,就需要采取同步行动,将发病率降低到临界水平以下,从而控制传播。本文利用关于所需临界质量的公共和私人信息下的全球协调博弈模型,描述了根除运动的成功概率。作为全球博弈的标准,私人信号的异质性可以支持一种独特的均衡。部分由于战略互动,每当单位参与成本下降时,集中生产就会促进根除。操纵临界质量的政策既有直接效应,也有战略协调效应。操纵信息的策略可能会产生微妙而非直观的后果。一个预防疾病的项目也可以用类似的模型来模拟。研究还表明,协调问题可能导致动物疾病保险市场的多重均衡,因此,这些市场可能通过为多重低效均衡创造机会,使疾病根除计划复杂化。私人保险市场的存在可能会促进协调,无论好坏,都可能决定一个计划的命运。
Farmed animal production has traditionally been a dispersed sector. Biosecurity actions relevant to eradicating infectious diseases are generally non-contractible, and might involve inordinately high transactions costs if they were contractible. If an endemic disease is to be eradicated within a region, synchronized actions need to be taken to reduce incidence below a critical mass so that spread can be contained. Using a global game model of coordination under public and private information concerning the critical mass required, this paper characterizes the success probability in an eradication campaign. As is standard in global games, heterogeneity in private signals can support a unique equilibrium. Partly because of strategic interactions, concentrated production is found to facilitate eradication whenever unit participation costs are decreasing. Policies to manipulate the critical mass have both a direct effect and a strategic coordination effect. Policies to manipulate information can have subtle and non-intuitive consequences. A program to keep disease out can be modeled similarly. It is shown, too, that coordination problems may lead to multiple equilibria in animal disease insurance markets, so that these markets may complicate a disease eradication program by creating opportunities for multiple inefficient equilibria. The presence of private insurance markets may facilitate coordination and, for good or ill, can seal the fate of a program.