Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting
Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.004
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发表时间：
2014-06-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Yamaguchi, Chikara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Itaya, Jun-ichi;Okamura, Makoto;Yamaguchi, Chikara
本文研究了在重复博弈环境下，以税收收入最大化为目标的区域或国家主权政府间部分税收协调的可持续性和稳定性问题。我们发现，部分税收协调更有可能占上风，无论是在联盟子集团的国家数量较小，或者如果现有的国家在整个经济的数量较大。这些结果的主要驱动力是税收竞争强度的反应。税收竞争强度的增加（降低）使得局部税收协调更具（更少）可持续性。我们还检查了上述结果的鲁棒性使用的基本模型，通过扩展它在三个方面：线性效用的情况下，一个棍棒和胡萝卜的惩罚策略，和不对称的资本禀赋在国家之间。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
This paper addresses the sustainability and stability problems of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments that aim to maximize tax revenues in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either if the number of countries in a coalition subgroup is smaller or if the number of existing countries in the entire economy is larger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable. We also examine the robustness of the above result using the basic model by extending it in three ways: to the case of linear utility, a stick-and-carrot punishment strategy, and asymmetric capital endowments across countries. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.