The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods
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外部性、公共物品和俱乐部物品理论:提供公共物品的替代机制

DOI:
10.1017/cbo9781139174312.008
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发表时间:
1996
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
T. Sandler
T. Sandler
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
R. Cornes;T. Sandler

文献摘要

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纳什-古诺均衡模型似乎暗示了公共产品供给不足的系统性趋势,这鼓励了对替代性配置机制的广泛分析,并根据帕累托有效配置提供的标准对其进行评估。本章的目的是对这些大量而多样的文献进行回顾,这一章必然是精挑细选的。我们开始仔细研究帕累托有效或帕累托最优分配的集合。公共物品的帕累托最优供给在公共物品经济中,正如在私人物品经济中一样,最优性标准通常确定的不是一个,而是无限多个分配--图7 - 1中R和S之间效用可能性边界上的所有点。任何关于“最优”的讨论都必须假定,要么是一个非常特殊的结构,这样,沿着边界RS的每一次分配都确实有一个Q的最优水平,要么是引入某种社会福利函数,使我们能够对最优进行排序,并选出最优的最优值。然而,经济学家经常表示并依赖于这样的希望,即某些分配决定可以在不考虑分配因素的情况下做出。在目前的情况下,这反映在许多处理方法中,这些方法提到了提供公共产品的最佳水平,但没有对私人产品的分配以及效用作出任何明确的假设。
The systematic tendency toward underprovision of a public good that seems to be implied by the model of Nash-Cournot equilibrium has encouraged extensive analysis of alternative allocative mechanisms and their evaluation against the yardstick provided by the set of Pareto-efficient allocations. The aim of this chapter, which is necessarily highly selective, is to review some of this large and varied literature. We begin with a closer look at the set of Pareto-efficient, or Paretooptimal, allocations. Pareto-optimal provision of public goods In the public goods economy, just as in its private goods counterpart, the optimality criterion typically identifies not one, but an infinite number of allocations – all the points on the utility possibilities frontier between R and S in Figure 7.1. Any discussion of “the optimum” must presuppose either a very special structure, so that there is, indeed, a single optimal level of Q associated with every allocation along the frontier RS , or else the introduction of some kind of social welfare function that enables us to rank optima and pick out the optimum optimorum. Economists have, however, often expressed and relied upon the hope that certain allocation decisions can be made without reference to distributional considerations. In the present context, this is reflected in many treatments that refer to the optimal level of provision of a public good without any explicit assumption concerning the distribution of private goods and hence of utility.