CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM
CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM
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中央银行作为政治主要代理问题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01917.x
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Christopher J. Waller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Fratianni;J. Hagen;Christopher J. Waller
由于货币政策的委托代理性质，可能会出现通货膨胀和稳定化倾向。两者都取决于政治不确定性的程度以及央行行长与现任政治领导人之间的关系类型。具体而言，我们的分析表明，央行行长和现任政治领导人之间的密切关系如何导致不良结果，特别是在选举竞争和政治不确定性时期。为解决这一问题提出了各种体制建议。我们的分析表明，相对于弗里德曼型的政策规则或任命“保守”的中央银行家，个人独立的中央银行家从政府或业绩导向的薪酬方案可以实现最佳的稳定和消除通货膨胀的偏见。
An inflation and stabilization bias may arise as a result of the principal-agent nature of monetary policy. Both depend on the degree of political uncertainty and the type of relationship between central bankers and the incumbent political leaders. Specifically, our analysis indicates how a close relationship between central bankers and incumbent political leaders can lead to undesirable outcomes, particularly so during periods of electoral competition and political uncertainty. Various institutional proposals exist for resolving this problem. Our analysis shows that in contrast to Friedman-type policy rules or the appointment of `conservative' central bankers, personal independence of the central banker from government or performance-orientated compensation packages can achieve both optimal stabilization and the elimination of the inflation bias.