Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: Evidence from India
Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: Evidence from India
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DOI：
10.1162/jeea.2008.6.2-3.501
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发表时间：
2008-04-01
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Pande, Rohini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Field, Erica;Pande, Rohini
与银行债务合同形成鲜明对比的是，大多数小额供资合同要求在贷款发放后几乎立即开始偿还，此后每周偿还一次。尽管经济理论表明，更灵活的还款时间表将使客户受益，并可能提高他们的还款能力，但小额供资从业人员认为，频繁还款所带来的财政纪律对防止贷款违约至关重要。在本文中，我们使用的数据从一个现场实验，随机客户分配到一个每周或每月的还款时间表，并没有发现显着的影响类型的还款时间表对客户拖欠或违约。我们的研究结果表明，在小额信贷客户中，谁愿意借在每周或每月还款时间表，一个更灵活的时间表可以显着降低交易成本，而不会增加客户违约。
In stark contrast to bank debt contracts, most micro-finance contracts require that repayments start nearly immediately after loan disbursement and occur weekly thereafter. Even though economic theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity, micro-finance practitioners argue that the fiscal discipline imposed by frequent repayment is critical to preventing loan default. In this paper we use data from a field experiment which randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client delinquency or default. Our findings suggest that, among micro-finance clients, who are willing to borrow at either weekly or monthly repayment schedules, a more flexible schedule can significantly lower transaction costs without increasing client default.