Labour market institutions and wage setting: evidence for OECD countries
Labour market institutions and wage setting: evidence for OECD countries
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劳动力市场机构和工资设定：经合组织国家的证据
DOI：
10.1080/00036841003689721
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Elena Podrecca
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elena Podrecca
劳动力市场机构应该通过它们对工资曲线关键参数的影响来影响失业。特别是，劳动力市场机构可能既有直接的工资推动(或水平)效应，即改变任何给定失业率和生产率水平的实际工资水平，也有间接的斜率效应，即改变实际工资对失业率的反应。本文讨论的问题是，是否有任何证据表明这些传播机制在1960年至1999年期间在经济合作与发展组织(经合组织)20国集团中发挥作用。分析分两步完成。首先获得了包括失业率、生产率和一组工资推动机构在内的工资方程的汇集平均组(PMG)估计，只允许制度系数的子集是同质的，同时允许失业率和其他系数在不同国家自由地有所不同。然后使用各国对失业系数的估计数来调查估计工资对失业的反应中的跨国异质性是否与体制差异有关，以及在多大程度上与体制差异有关。结果支持工会密度和福利替代率存在显著的工资推动效应，福利替代率、福利持续时间和就业保护存在显著的斜率效应。研究发现，更慷慨的失业救济金结构会降低工资对失业的反应能力，而与人们预期的相反，更高的就业保障会增强工资对失业的反应。税收楔形和讨价还价协调不存在显著的水平效应和斜率效应。
The main channel through which labour market institutions are supposed to work in affecting unemployment is through their effects on the key parameters of the wage curve. In particular, labour market institutions may have both a direct wage push (or level) effect, i.e. change the level of the real wage for any given level of the unemployment rate and productivity, and an indirect slope effect, i.e. change the responsiveness of the real wage to the unemployment rate. The question this article addresses is whether there is any evidence that these transmission mechanisms were at work in a group of 20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1960 to 1999. The analysis is accomplished in two steps. Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimates of a wage equation including unemployment, productivity and a set of wage push institutions are first obtained, allowing only a subset of institutional coefficient to be homogeneous, while leaving the unemployment and other coefficients free to differ across countries. The country specific estimates of the unemployment coefficients are then used to investigate whether and to what extent cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated wage response to unemployment is related to institutional differences. The results support the existence of significant wage push effects of union density and benefit replacement rates, and of significant slope effects of benefit replacement rates, benefit duration and employment protection. A more generous unemployment benefit structure is found to lower the wage responsiveness to unemployment, while higher employment protection, contrary to what one expects, is found to enhance it. No significant level and slope effects are found for the tax wedge and bargaining coordination.