Contracting in Ocean Shipping Market Under Asymmetric Information
Contracting in Ocean Shipping Market Under Asymmetric Information
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信息不对称下的海运市场承包
DOI：
10.1142/s0217595920500062
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Xuwen Cong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mingzhu Yu;Ruina Yang;Zelong Yi;Xuwen Cong
在本文中，我们不仅开发了一个Stackelberg游戏，以捕捉独特的特点，海洋货运，但也采用了筛选模型来解决合同之间的问题，一个承运人和一个货运代理人在不对称信息。货运代理面临来自多个托运人的随机需求。在我们的框架中，现货价格与托运人的需求正相关。首先推导出货代商的最优策略，然后建立了对称信息和非对称信息下承运人的合同设计问题。随后，我们充分描述了两部分关税合同的均衡参数。随后进行的数值实验表明：（1）在发货人需求与现货价格相关性较高的情况下，承运人倾向于较低的采购价格，而代运人在旺季通过合同订购更多的货物;（2）当市场需求波动剧烈时，承运人应提高采购价格，代运人应通过合同订购更多的货物;在信息不对称程度较高的情况下，承运人倾向于较高的采购价格，而代运人则更依赖于现货市场而不是合同市场。
In this paper, we not only develop a Stackelberg game to capture the unique characteristics of the ocean freight transportation, but also employ a screening model to address the contracting issue between one carrier and one freight forwarder under asymmetric information. The freight forwarder faces random demand from multiple shippers. In our framework, the spot price is positively correlated with the shippers’ demand. We first derive the forwarder’s optimal strategy, and then formulate the carrier’s contract design problem under symmetric and asymmetric information. Subsequently, we fully characterize the equilibrium parameters for a two-part tariff contract. The numerical experiments conducted thereafter reveal that (i) under a higher correlation between the shippers’ demand and the spot price, the carrier prefers a lower purchase price and the forwarder orders more through a contract in the peak seasons; (ii) when the market demand is extremely volatile, the carrier should raise the purchase price and the forwarder should order more through a contract; and (iii) with a higher degree of information asymmetry, the carrier prefers a higher purchase price while the forwarder relies more on the spot market than the contract market.