Cryptanalysis and improvement of a quantum communication-based online shopping mechanism
Cryptanalysis and improvement of a quantum communication-based online shopping mechanism
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DOI：
10.1007/s11128-015-0958-4
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发表时间：
2014-10
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Wei Huang-;Ying-Hui Yang;H. Jia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Wei Huang-;Ying-Hui Yang;H. Jia
最近，Chou等人（Electron Commer Res 14：349-367，2014）提出了一种可用于在线购物的新型受控量子安全直接通信协议。作者声称，他们的协议是免疫攻击的外部窃听者和内部背叛者。然而，我们发现该协议容易受到内部背叛者的攻击。本文分析了该协议的安全性，证明了该协议中的控制者能够窃听发送者的秘密信息（即，客户的购物信息），这表明它不能像作者所期望的那样用于安全的在线购物。在此基础上，提出了一种改进的协议，使其能够抵抗控制器的攻击。此外，我们提出了另一个协议，这是更适合于网上购物。最后，讨论了量子安全直接通信过程与常规量子通信和网上购物在细节上的区别。
Recently, Chou et al. (Electron Commer Res 14:349–367, 2014) presented a novel controlled quantum secure direct communication protocol which can be used for online shopping. The authors claimed that their protocol was immune to the attacks from both external eavesdropper and internal betrayer. However, we find that this protocol is vulnerable to the attack from internal betrayer. In this paper, we analyze the security of this protocol to show that the controller in this protocol is able to eavesdrop the secret information of the sender (i.e., the customer’s shopping information), which indicates that it cannot be used for secure online shopping as the authors expected. Accordingly, an improvement of this protocol, which could resist the controller’s attack, is proposed. In addition, we present another protocol which is more appropriate for online shopping. Finally, a discussion about the difference in detail of the quantum secure direct communication process between regular quantum communications and online shopping is given.