The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence
The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence
复制标题
元元认知判断的准确性：调节信心的现实性
DOI：
10.1007/s10339-012-0440-5
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
C. M. Allwood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sandra Buratti;C. M. Allwood
人们是否可以通过取消选择最不现实的判断来提高他们对情景记忆报告正确性的信心判断的现实性？Koriat和金匠（Psychol Rev 103：490-517，1996）模型的一个假设是，信心判断调节记忆报告的报告。我们测试了这一假设是否适用于信心判断的现实主义（准确性）的监管。在两个实验中，270名成年人在不同的条件下回答了50个关于刚看过的视频内容的识别和回忆问题。在每个答案之后，他们对答案的正确性做出了信心判断。在实验一中，当被试排除15个问题时，再认条件下的被试的绝对偏差显著增加。在实验2中，回忆条件下的参与者显着提高了他们的校准。结果表明，回忆，而不是承认，提供了有效的线索，参与者增加他们的报告的真实性。然而，影响是小的，只有弱支持的结论，人们有一定的能力，调节他们的信心判断的现实主义。
Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith’s (Psychol Rev 103:490–517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer’s correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.