Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense: Building the Scientific Foundation
Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense: Building the Scientific Foundation
复制标题
自适应网络防御的对抗性和不确定性推理：建立科学基础
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peng Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Cybenko;S. Jajodia;Michael P. Wellman;Peng Liu
今天的网络防御在很大程度上是静态的。它们由缓慢的审议过程控制，包括测试、安全补丁部署和人工监控。因此，攻击者可以系统地探测目标网络，预先计划他们的攻击，并最终在受损的网络和主机中长时间存在。一种名为自适应网络防御（ACD）的新技术正在开发中，它为对手提供了最佳变化的攻击面和系统配置，迫使对手不断重新评估和重新规划其网络行动。虽然这些方法（例如，移动目标防御、动态多样性和生物启发防御）是有希望的，它们假设静止和随机的，但非对抗性的环境。为了充分发挥潜力，我们需要建立科学基础，以便以严格可靠的方式严格定义，量化，测量和推断对抗环境中的系统弹性和鲁棒性。
Today’s cyber defenses are largely static. They are governed by slow deliberative processes involving testing, security patch deployment, and human-in-the-loop monitoring. As a result, adversaries can systematically probe target networks, pre-plan their attacks, and ultimately persist for long times inside compromised networks and hosts. A new class of technologies, called Adaptive Cyber Defense (ACD), is being developed that presents adversaries with optimally changing attack surfaces and system configurations, forcing adversaries to continually re-assess and re-plan their cyber operations. Although these approaches (e.g., moving target defense, dynamic diversity, and bio-inspired defense) are promising, they assume stationary and stochastic, but non-adversarial, environments. To realize the full potential, we need to build the scientific foundations so that system resiliency and robustness in adversarial settings can be rigorously defined, quantified, measured, and extrapolated in a rigorous and reliable manner.