Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy
Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy
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让人民自由：民主的故事
DOI：
10.1093/ehr/cem128
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
John Cannon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
John Cannon
在一个严肃的政治讨论几乎消失，我们被口号、标识、拍照机会和声音片段填饱肚子的时代，欢迎一本涉及重要主题的书是令人振奋的，而且这本书做得很出色。邓恩没有在雅典的民主上浪费太多时间，在雅典的民主中，参与是令人印象深刻的，前提是一个人忽视了妇女和奴隶--绝大多数。相反，他感兴趣的是，在过去两百年里，大多数希腊人认为，要不惜一切代价避免短暂和不稳定的危险的“民主”一词，首先是一种看似合理的政治制度，然后是一种胜利的政治制度。的确，仍然有人认为它是一剂灵丹妙药，可以解决人类的所有问题，带来永久的和平与安宁。首先，邓恩澄清了一些误解。在现代世界，民主不可能意味着人民统治自己。没有任何可以想象的机制可以实现这一点。这确实意味着，人们至少可以对自己的尺子有一些选择，并对他们产生一些轻微的影响。保留意见是巨大的，邓恩接受了这些保留意见：选择可能是特威德勒姆和特威德迪；Spin的增长使得即使是最热心的公民也很难知道真正发生了什么；不幸的是，政客们并不总是说实话。具有讽刺意味的是，民主似乎刚刚战胜了意识形态上的对手，它自身的缺陷就越来越暴露在聚光灯下。邓恩写道，选民很容易在面临的选择面前失去信心。他指出，在许多国家，越来越少的人足够在意投票。尼安德特人说，必须迫使他们这样做。他们必须三思而后行，欧洲狂热分子说。但是，作为一种神奇的药水，还有比仅仅幻想破灭更糟糕的危险。这是一种拒绝。如果被解放的人民选择支持恐怖主义，投票支持对他们的敌人进行报复，并愿意将越来越多的权力移交给他们的总统，会发生什么？邓恩的方法是平衡和明智的，他承认这一点。我相信，他不会期望他的读者同意他的所有评论和例子。他大量使用“利己主义的秩序”这个短语来描述这个公式，这个公式最终取得了胜利。这是一个愚蠢的术语，尽管让-雅克·卢梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau)将其神圣化，并扭曲了论点，暗示着贪婪和自私。我不相信道德上的反对应该压在那些希望他们的医院干净，他们的水供应没有污染，希望他们的孩子活着的人身上。假设我们用的是法国大革命时期那句诱人的口号--“事业向人才敞开大门”--这句话之所以诱人，是因为它听起来既自由又乐观(我们中很少有人愿意承认我们可能没有太多天赋)，而实际上，它肯定会引起严重的分歧。这可能会让民主在意识形态上的成功变得更容易理解？邓恩对罗伯斯庇尔投入的注意力似乎值得怀疑。当然，他只是卢梭的奴隶追随者，他们共同坚持的人们本质上是善良的(无论这意味着什么)是轻而易举的，因为在这种情况下，政府的方式几乎不会
In a period when serious political discussion has almost vanished and we are fed on slogans, logos, photo-opportunities and sound-bites, it is heartening to welcome a book which tackles important themes, and does so brilliantly. Dunn does not waste much time on Athenian democracy, in which participation was impressive provided that one ignores women and slaves—the vast majority. Instead, his interest is in the way their word ‘democracy’—regarded by most Greeks as a danger to be avoided at all costs, transient and unstable—became, in the last two hundred years, first a plausible political system, then a triumphant one. Indeed, there are still some who regard it as a magic potion which will solve all human problems and usher in permanent peace and tranquillity. First, Dunn clears away some misunderstandings. In the modern world, democracy cannot possibly mean that people rule themselves. There is no conceivable mechanism that could achieve such a thing. It does mean that people have, at least, some choice of their rulers, and some slight influence over them. The reservations are enormous and Dunn accepts them: the choice may be Tweedledum and Tweedledee; the growth of spin makes it hard for even the most earnest citizen to know what is really happening; and politicians, sad to say, do not always tell the truth. Ironically, no sooner did democracy seem to triumph over its ideological opponents, than its own defects came increasingly under the spotlight.‘It is easy’, writes Dunn,‘for the electors to lose heart in the face of the options presented to them’, and he notes that in many countries fewer and fewer care sufficiently to cast their votes. They must be made to, say the Neanderthals. They must think again, say the Euro-fanatics. But, as a magic potion, there are worse dangers than mere disillusion. There is rejection. What if emancipated peoples choose to endorse terrorism, vote for vengeance on their enemies, and willingly surrender more and more power to their Presidents? Dunn’s approach is balanced and sensible, and he admits much of this. He would not, I am sure, expect his readers to agree with all his commentary and examples. He makes much use of the phrase ‘Order of Egoism’to describe the formula which, in the end, triumphed. It is a blunderbuss term, even if sanctified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and distorts the argument, implying greed and selfishness. I am not convinced that moral disapprobation should be loaded upon people who want their hospitals to be clean, their water supplies uncontaminated, and their children to live. Suppose, instead, we had used that enticing slogan from the French Revolution,‘the career open to talent’—enticing because it sounds liberal and optimistic (few of us being willing to concede that we may not have much talent), while in practice it must be deeply divisive. That might have made democracy’s ideological success more intelligible? The amount of attention Dunn devotes to Robespierre seems questionable. Surely he was but a slavish acolyte of Rousseau, and their common insistence that people are fundamentally virtuous (whatever that means) is facile since, in that case, little in the way of government would be