Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
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DOI：
10.1057/imfer.2012.10
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发表时间：
2012-06
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas;M. Kose;S. Claessens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas;M. Kose;S. Claessens
当局正如Olivier Blanchard在2011年3月7日至8日国际货币基金组织关于危机后宏观和增长政策的优秀会议的结论中所强调的那样，多重目标需要多种工具（Blanchard and others，2012）。但货币当局和其他当局应该使用什么工具来实现这些宏观审慎目标呢？它们应该如何与传统的利率政策一起部署？正在进行的体制改革对系统性风险以及传统和宏观审慎政策的有效性有何影响？哪些风险来源需要认真监测和政策应对？哪些特定市场可能成为金融不稳定的来源，以及通过哪些渠道？经济状况的不确定性程度或系统性风险程度如何影响这些政策的实施？2011年11月10日至11日在华盛顿国际货币基金组织总部举行的国际货币基金组织第12届雅克·波拉克年度研究会议讨论了其中一些问题。主题是“货币政策和宏观审慎政策”。这期《国际货币基金组织经济评论》特刊为您带来了该会议上演讲背后的一些关键学术文章。与往常一样，所有这些论文都经过了严格的评审过程，并受益于讨论者、与会者、编辑委员会成员和会议组织委员会成员提供的广泛反馈。这个话题很广泛，而我们的知识仍然非常有限。一个让我们能够系统地分析货币政策和宏观审慎政策之间的关系并量化相关权衡的主力模型仍然没有出现。也许这就是事物的本质。面对一系列新的和具有挑战性的问题，第一步包括建立相关的事实和开发简单的模型来建立我们的直觉，然后转向更雄心勃勃的建模练习。2011年，由Hyun Song Shin教授（普林斯顿大学）主持的蒙代尔-弗莱明讲座完美地说明了通过这种方式可以学到多少东西。《全球银行业过剩与贷款风险溢价》一书对全球银行（尤其是欧洲银行）在充当美元基金中介和影响全球信贷状况方面所扮演的角色进行了精彩的描述。他的演讲的第一部分仔细拼凑了来自国际清算银行银行统计数据和美国来源的证据，以说明全球银行在设定整体信贷条件方面的作用。讲座的第二部分借用了信贷风险的文献，建立了一个简单而优雅的风险模型，从直接和中介信贷。在该模型中，全球银行通过周期调整其杠杆率，始终将其资产负债表扩大到最大容量。在经济繁荣时期，金融机构通过增加借贷来增加放贷，为经济提供越来越廉价的信贷。这种“全球银行过剩”可能比“全球储蓄过剩”对全球金融稳定更重要，申教授将受金融危机影响的发达国家与其银行参与这种中介银行过剩联系起来。从政策的角度来看，申教授的演讲提醒我们，
authorities. Multiple objectives require multiple instruments, as was emphasized by Olivier Blanchard in the conclusions of the excellent March 7–8, 2011 IMF conference on Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis (Blanchard and others, 2012). But what instruments should monetary and other authorities use to achieve these macroprudential objectives? How should they be deployed alongside traditional interest rate policy? What are the implications of ongoing institutional reforms on systemic risk and the effectiveness of traditional and macroprudential policies? Which sources of risk require careful monitoring and policy response? Which specific markets can be a source of financial instability and through which channels? How does the degree of uncertainty in the state of the economy or in the degree of systemic risk affect the conduct of these policies? The 12th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference of the IMF, which took place at the IMF headquarters in Washington DC on November 10–11, 2011, addressed some of these issues. The topic was “Monetary and Macroprudential Policies.” This special issue of the IMF Economic Review brings to you some of the key academic articles behind the presentations at that conference. As usual, all of these papers went through a rigorous refereeing process, and benefited from extensive feedback provided by the discussants, conference participants, members of the Editorial Board, and conference organization committee members. The topic is vast, and our knowledge is still very limited. A workhorse model allowing us to systematically analyze the relationships between monetary and macroprudential policies and quantify the relevant trade-offs is still eluding us. Perhaps this is in the nature of things. Confronted with a set of new and challenging questions, the first steps consist in establishing the relevant facts and developing simple models to build our intuition, and then in moving to more ambitious modeling exercises. The 2011 Mundell-Fleming lecture, by Professor Hyun Song Shin (Princeton), beautifully illustrates how much can be learned by proceeding in this way.“Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium” provides a fascinating account of the role global banks, especially European ones, played in intermediating US dollar funds and influencing global credit conditions. The first part of his lecture carefully pieces together evidence from BIS banking statistics and US sources to illustrate the role of global banks in setting overall credit conditions. The second part of the lecture borrows from the literature on credit risk to build a simple and elegant model of risks arising from direct and intermediated credit. In the model, global banks adjust their leverage through the cycle, always expanding their balance sheet to the maximum capacity. In good times, financial institutions lend more by borrowing more, supplying increasingly cheap credit to the economy. This “global banking glut” may have been more important than the “global saving glut” for global financial (in) stability, and Professor Shin makes links between advanced countries affected by the financial crisis and their banks’ participation in this intermediating banking glut. From a policy perspective, Professor Shin’s lecture reminds us of the