Formal and Informal Ratification in the Intergovernmental Policies of the European Union

Formal and Informal Ratification in the Intergovernmental Policies of the European Union
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欧盟政府间政策的正式和非正式批准

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发表时间:
2004
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通讯作者:
R. Pahre
R. Pahre
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作者:
R. Pahre

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普特南的“两级博弈”理论催生了许多研究国际和国内政治之间的相互作用,其中许多集中在欧盟的政治。虽然注意到批准可以是正式的或非正式的,但这些文献大多将每个重要的国内行为者视为事实上拥有正式批准权。这意味着文献忽略了正式批准和非正式批准之间的真实的区别。非正式批准可以被认为是政府为不受欢迎的国际协议支付“观众成本”的一种情况。在这种情况下,政府必须不断回应公众的意见。这就提出了与政府所面临的限制截然不同的限制,政府必须获得立法机构(或其他行为者)的正式批准。例如,分裂的政府对非正式批准的可能性没有影响,但往往影响收益的分配,而它往往影响正式批准的可能性,但往往对收益的分配没有影响。由于这两种批准方式有很大的不同,普特南的批准比喻并不总是欧盟两级政治的最恰当的概念化。正式批准的比喻尤其不适合研究欧盟第二和第三支柱的政策制定,这主要是政府间谈判的特点,没有正式批准的要求。
Putnam’s theory of “two-level games” has spawned numerous studies examining the interaction between international and domestic politics, many focusing on politics in the European Union. While noting that ratification may be formal or informal, much of this literature treats each important domestic actor as if it has de facto formal ratification power. This means that the literature overlooks the very real distinction between formal and informal ratification. Informal ratification may be thought of as a case in which the government pays “audience costs” for unpopular international agreements. In this case, a government must respond continuously to public opinion. This presents constraints very different from those faced by governments who must obtain the formal approval of the legislature (or other actor). For example, divided government has no effect on the likelihood of informal ratification but often does affect the distribution of gains, while it often affects the likelihood of formal ratification but often has no effect on the distribution of the gains. Because these kinds of ratification differ significantly, Putnam’s ratification metaphor is not always the most appropriate conceptualization of two-level politics in the European Union. The formal ratification metaphor is especially inappropriate for studying policy-making in the second and third pillars of the EU, which are mostly characterized by intergovernmental bargaining without formal ratification requirements.