Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies
Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00850.x
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发表时间：
2009-10-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Debus, Marc
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Braeuninger, Thomas;Debus, Marc
比较政治学中的各种文献都将政府视为议会民主国家立法政策制定的唯一值得注意的发起者和主要动力。政策制定中的反对活动通常与阻止政策而不是制定政策的意图相关。这种看法反映了现实生活中的政治吗？为了回答这个问题，本文讨论了不同的论点，这些论点将制度和政策相关特征与不同政府和议会行为者发起或共同发起立法法案的激励和约束联系起来。更具体地说，它将政策、办公室和投票相关的激励措施，以及立法行为者的机构和资源限制，与这些行为者在立法议程制定中发挥带头作用的可能性联系起来。这些论点面临着关于四个议会体系在过去五年中所有立法法案范围的原始数据。文章的结论是，反对派，特别是两党共同制定议程确实很少见。然而，与广泛持有的格言相反，它既不是缺失也不是虚假的，而是与（联合）政府和议会内部以及之间的权力分配和意识形态冲突的强度有关。
Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real-life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy-related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co-sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy-, office- and vote-related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda-setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda-setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.