'Unwilling' versus 'unable': capuchin monkeys' (Cebus apella) understanding of human intentional action
'Unwilling' versus 'unable': capuchin monkeys' (Cebus apella) understanding of human intentional action
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00840.x
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发表时间：
2009-11-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Santos, Laurie R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Phillips, Webb;Barnes, Jennifer L.;Santos, Laurie R.
对人类行为背后的意图的敏感性是婴儿的一项重要发展成就。这种意图阅读能力是人类进化和文化的一种独特的、相对较新的产物，还是这种能力起源于我们非人类的灵长类祖先？Call及其同事（2004年）最近的研究为后一种假设提供了证据，证明黑猩猩对人类的意图也很敏感。具体来说，当实验者表现得好像他打算给食物，但不能这样做时，黑猩猩在测试区域停留的时间更长，表现出更少的挫折行为，而不是当实验者表现得好像他不打算给食物时。目前的研究建立在并扩展了这一范式，提供了一些第一个证据的意图阅读在一个更遥远的灵长类亲戚，僧帽猴（Cebus apella）。像黑猩猩一样，卷尾猴也能区分不同的目标导向行为，当实验者表现出不愿意给食物时，它会比表现出不能给食物时更快地离开围栏。此外，我们发现，这种模式是特定于有生命的行动，并没有获得当相同的行动是由无生命的杆，而不是人类的手（类似的逻辑，见伍德沃德，1998年）。结合之前的证据，目前的研究表明，我们自己的意图阅读并不是人类物种的一个完全独特的方面，而是在灵长类动物中广泛共享的。
A sensitivity to the intentions behind human action is a crucial developmental achievement in infants. Is this intention reading ability a unique and relatively recent product of human evolution and culture, or does this capacity instead have roots in our non-human primate ancestors? Recent work by Call and colleagues (2004) lends credence to the latter hypothesis, providing evidence that chimpanzees are also sensitive to human intentions. Specifically, chimpanzees remained in a testing area longer and exhibited fewer frustration behaviors when an experimenter behaved as if he intended to give food but was unable to do so, than when the experimenter behaved as if he had no intention of giving food. The present research builds on and extends this paradigm, providing some of the first evidence of intention reading in a more distant primate relative, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Like chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys distinguish between different goal-directed acts, vacating an enclosure sooner when an experimenter acts unwilling to give food than when she acts unable to give food. Additionally, we found that this pattern is specific to animate action, and does not obtain when the same actions are performed by inanimate rods instead of human hands (for a similar logic, see Woodward, 1998). Taken together with the previous evidence, the present research suggests that our own intention reading is not a wholly unique aspect of the human species, but rather is shared broadly across the primate order.