Your Noise, My Signal: Exploiting Switching Noise for Stealthy Data Exfiltration from Desktop Computers?
Your Noise, My Signal: Exploiting Switching Noise for Stealthy Data Exfiltration from Desktop Computers?
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你的噪音，我的信号：利用开关噪音从台式计算机中秘密窃取数据？
DOI：
10.1145/3410048.3410094
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ren, Shaolei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shao, Zhihui;Islam, Mohammad A.;Ren, Shaolei
基于功率分析的攻击已经存在和研究了很长时间，最近的一些工作集中在不使用传统通信的情况下从受害者系统中泄漏数据（例如，WiFi）。尽管如此，先前的工作通常依赖于侵入式直接功率测量，通过在电源插座中植入仪表或接入电力电缆，从而危及攻击的隐蔽性。在本文中，我们提出了NoDE（Noise for Data Exfiltration），这是一种用于从企业桌面计算机中隐藏数据的新系统。具体地，节点通过利用高频电压纹波（即，开关噪声）由内置于当今计算机中的功率因数校正电路产生。该接收器位于一定距离处，甚至位于不同的房间，可以非侵入性地测量电源插座的电压，以捕获高频开关噪声，用于在线信息解码，而无需监督训练/学习。为了评估节点，我们运行实验的七个不同的计算机从顶级供应商和使用顶级品牌的电源设备。我们的研究结果表明，对于单个发射器，NoDE在90英尺（27.4米）的距离内实现了高达28.48比特/秒的速率，而没有视线，这表明了一种实际上的隐形威胁。基于不同的计算机的开关噪声频率的正交性，我们还演示了同时从四台计算机使用一个接收机的数据渗出。最后，我们提出了一些可能的防御措施，如安装噪音过滤器，并讨论了它们的局限性。
Attacks based on power analysis have been long existing and studied, with some recent works focused on data exfiltration from victim systems without using conventional communications (e.g., WiFi). Nonetheless, prior works typically rely on intrusive direct power measurement, either by implanting meters in the power outlet or tapping into the power cable, thus jeopardizing the stealthiness of attacks. In this paper, we propose NoDE (Noise for Data Exfiltration), a new system for stealthy data exfiltration from enterprise desktop computers. Specifically, NoDE achieves data exfiltration over a building's power network by exploiting high-frequency voltage ripples (i.e., switching noises) generated by power factor correction circuits built into today's computers. Located at a distance and even from a different room, the receiver can non-intrusively measure the voltage of a power outlet to capture the high-frequency switching noises for online information decoding without supervised training/learning. To evaluate NoDE, we run experiments on seven different computers from top vendors and using top-brand power supply units. Our results show that for a single transmitter, NoDE achieves a rate of up to 28.48 bits/second with a distance of 90 feet (27.4 meters) without the line of sight, demonstrating a practically stealthy threat. Based on the orthogonality of switching noise frequencies of different computers, we also demonstrate simultaneous data exfiltration from four computers using only one receiver. Finally, we present a few possible defenses, such as installing noise filters, and discuss their limitations.