Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions
Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions
复制标题
采购拍卖中针对非竞争性投标的强力筛选机制
DOI：
10.3982/ecta17155
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发表时间：
2022-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Ortner, Juan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chassang, Sylvain;Kawai, Kei;Ortner, Juan
我们记录了一个新的投标模式，从日本采购拍卖观察：中标往往是孤立的，有一个失踪的质量接近失败的出价。这种模式在以下意义上是可疑的：它的极端形式与任意信息结构下的竞争行为不一致。基于这一观察，我们开发了系统的测试，在采购拍卖，允许一般的信息结构，以及非平稳的未观察到的异质性的竞争行为。我们提供了我们的测试的实证探索，并表明它们可以帮助识别数据中的其他可疑模式。
We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated, and there is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: its extreme forms are inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop systematic tests of competitive behavior in procurement auctions that allow for general information structures as well as nonstationary unobserved heterogeneity. We provide an empirical exploration of our tests, and show they can help identify other suspicious patterns in the data.