Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly
Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly
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最优规制：自然垄断经济理论
DOI：
10.2307/2234556
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发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
K. Train
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Train
最优监管解决了监管经济学的核心问题-如何以一种诱导企业生产和定价“最优”的方式监管企业。“它综合了大量理论文献的主要发现，这些文献涉及在各种情况下什么构成最优性，以及可以使用哪些调节机制来实现最优性。它是第一本对该领域提供统一、现代和非技术性处理的文本。这本书包括调节最优产量，关税和盈余补贴计划的模型，并以图形方式呈现所有材料，并对通常高度技术性的主题进行了清晰的解释。Kenneth E. Train是加州大学伯克利分校经济系和公共政策研究生院的副兼职教授。他也是剑桥系统公司的负责人。自然垄断的成本结构（规模经济和范围经济）。第一和第二最优性的特征。实现首优最优的剩余补贴方案。拉姆齐价格和Vogelsang-Finsinger机制来实现它们。分时电价和Riordan的多部自选电价机制，以及Sibley的自选电价实现最优的方法。收益率管制如何导致低效率的Averch-Johnson模型。根据企业的产出、成本或销售回报对监管进行分析。价格上限管制。不确定性的监管处理及其对企业行为的影响。在没有直接管制的情况下达到最优的方法（垄断稳定性，拍卖垄断特许权）。
Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how to regulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the major findings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situations and which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide a unified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field. The book includes models for regulating optimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically, with clear explanations of often highly technical topics. Kenneth E. Train is Associate Adjunct Professor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics. Topics include: The cost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope). Characterization of first and second-best optimality. Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality. Ramsey prices and the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them. Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan's mechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley's method for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality. The Averch-Johnson model of how rate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies. Analysis of regulation based on the firm's return on Output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation. Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impact on the firm's behavior. Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability, auctioning the monopoly franchise).