Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China*
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China*
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DOI：
10.1177/0001839218786263
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发表时间：
2018-06
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
Danqing Wang;X. Luo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Danqing Wang;X. Luo
我们发展了国家官员的政治激励如何影响企业行为的理论。在追求社会稳定和经济发展等多重目标的过程中，国家设计了评估官员绩效的标准。这些官员可能会受到激励，在其职业生涯的不同阶段优先考虑不同的目标，并动员公司帮助他们实现这些目标。我们在2001年至2011年中国上市公司多元化的背景下检验了我们的理论，当时国家面临着国有企业破产导致大量工人下岗的经济和社会后果。我们的研究结果表明，当大规模裁员发生时，一些企业通过收购破产的国有企业并重新雇用其工人，从而进入与其核心业务无关的行业。当公司所在省份的省长接近退休时，这种情况更有可能发生，因为对于即将退休的省长的职业目标来说，社会稳定比经济发展更重要。当一个省级政府经历了激烈的集体行动，使社会稳定成为更紧迫的焦点时，职业阶段对共产党领导人的影响较弱，他们更一贯地优先考虑社会稳定。对于那些更容易受到官员影响的公司，比如那些带有强烈社会主义印记的公司和那些依赖政府资源的公司，这种影响得到了加强。我们的研究扩展了韦伯国家文献和政治经济学对激励的研究，并为主要转型经济中的企业多元化提供了一个政治解释。
We develop a theory of how state officials’ political incentives can affect corporate behavior. In the pursuit of multiple goals, such as social stability and economic development, the state designs criteria to evaluate its officials’ performance. Those officials may be motivated to prioritize different goals at different stages of their careers and to mobilize firms to help them achieve those goals. We test our theory in the context of Chinese publicly listed firms’ diversification between 2001 and 2011, when the state faced economic and social ramifications of bankrupt state-owned enterprises (SOEs) laying off large numbers of workers. Our results show that when large layoffs occurred, some firms diversified into industries unrelated to their core business by acquiring bankrupt SOEs and reemploying their workers. This was more likely to occur when the governor of the firm’s home province was closer to retirement, as social stability was more important than economic development for the retiring governor’s career objective. The effect of career stage was weaker for Communist Party leaders, who more consistently prioritized social stability, and when a provincial state experienced intense collective actions that made social stability a stronger immediate focus. The effect was strengthened for firms more vulnerable to officials’ influence, such as those with a strong socialist imprint and those dependent on government resources. Our study extends the Weberian state literature and the political economy research on incentives, and it offers a political explanation for corporate diversification in a major transitional economy.