Evolutionarily stable investments in recognition systems explain patterns of discrimination failure and success

Evolutionarily stable investments in recognition systems explain patterns of discrimination failure and success
复制标题

DOI:
10.1098/rstb.2019.0465
复制
发表时间:
2020-07-06
影响因子:
6.3
通讯作者:
Reeve, H. Kern
Reeve, H. Kern
中科院分区:
生物学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Sheehan, Michael J.;Reeve, H. Kern

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

许多动物都能完成令我们震惊的识别壮举--比如一只啮齿动物能识别出它从未见过的亲戚。然而,在其他情况下,动物似乎毫无头绪,比如芦莺抚养的杜鹃幼崽与自己的物种没有任何相似之处。尤其令人费解的是,当它看起来是适应性的时候,却未能得到承认。在这里,我们提出了一个简单的拔河博弈模型,考察个人应该如何最优地投资,以影响对合意和不合意接受者的区分的准确性。在游戏中,有鉴别力的个体(操作者)和合意的和不合意的接受者(分别是靶子和模仿者)都可以为自己喜欢的结果投入努力。我们证明,当不受欢迎的接受者从不准确的识别中获得比其他两方从准确识别中获得的回报更大的适应度收益时,就会出现稳定的不准确识别。准确识别的概率通常只取决于合意的和不合意的接受者的相对收益,而不是鉴别者的相对收益。我们的结果为长期存在的难题提供了一个新的视角,包括在社会昆虫群体中缺乏裙带关系,对幼虫的耐受性,以及在巢中照顾额外配对幼鸟的雄鸟,我们的模型表明,这些问题往往缺乏准确的区分。本文是主题问题《识别系统中的信号检测理论:从进化模型到实验测试》的一部分。
Many animals are able to perform recognition feats that astound us-such as a rodent recognizing kin it has never met. Yet in other contexts, animals appear clueless as when reed warblers rear cuckoo chicks that bear no resemblance to their own species. Failures of recognition when it would seem adaptive have been especially puzzling. Here, we present a simple tug-of-war game theory model examining how individuals should optimally invest in affecting the accuracy of discrimination between desirable and undesirable recipients. In the game, discriminating individuals (operators) and desirable and undesirable recipients (targets and mimics, respectively) can all invest effort into their own preferred outcome. We demonstrate that stable inaccurate recognition will arise when undesirable recipients have large fitness gains from inaccurate recognition relative to the pay-offs that the other two parties receive from accurate recognition. The probability of accurate recognition is often determined by just the relative pay-offs to the desirable and undesirable recipients, rather than to the discriminator. Our results provide a new lens on long-standing puzzles including a lack of nepotism in social insect colonies, tolerance of brood parasites and male birds caring for extra-pair young in their nests, which our model suggests should often lack accurate discrimination.This article is part of the theme issue 'Signal detection theory in recognition systems: from evolving models to experimental tests'.