Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting
Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting
复制标题
不对称资本税竞争与利润转移
DOI：
10.1007/s00712-005-0131-0
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Sven Stöwhase
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sven Stöwhase
本文分析了当跨国公司可以在不同规模的司法管辖区之间转移部分税基时的资本税竞争。对于收入最大化的政府，我们表明，引入利润转移通常不会增加税率的下行压力。研究发现，利润转移降低了低税区的税基敏感性，却增加了高税区的税基敏感度。由于更多的利润转移机会，税率将会趋同。即使在一般均衡情况下，这两个法域的税率可能会降低或增加，但情况仍将如此。
This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base sensitivity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the sensitivity of the high tax jurisdiction. Tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. This will be the case even though in general equilibrium tax rates in both jurisdictions may decrease or increase.