Undermining Privacy in the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
Undermining Privacy in the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
复制标题
破坏飞机通信寻址和报告系统 (ACARS) 中的隐私
DOI：
10.1515/popets-2018-0023
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
I. Martinovic
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Matthew Smith;Daniel Moser;Martin Strohmeier;Vincent Lenders;I. Martinovic
摘要尽管飞机通信、寻址和报告系统（ACARS）被广泛应用了二十多年，但在航空界之外，很少有人对其进行审查。虽然最初被商业航空公司用于跟踪其航班并为机组人员提供自动计时，但今天它已成为许多航空利益相关者（包括私人飞机所有者，国家行为者和军方）的多用途空地数据链。这样的变化导致ACARS被使用远远超出其原来的任务，迄今为止，没有工作已经进行评估的程度，特别是关于隐私和使用it. In本文中的各种利益相关者群体，我们提出了一个分析ACARS的使用隐私敏感的演员，军事，政府和企业。我们进行这一研究使用的数据从VHF（传统的ACARS，和VDL模式2）和卫星通信子网。基于超过200万的ACARS消息收集的过程中的16个月，我们证明，目前的ACARS使用系统地违反位置隐私的所有检查航空利益相关者群体，解释的类型的消息用于导致这个问题，我们说明了三个案例研究的挑战-每个利益相关者群体之一-显示多少隐私敏感信息可以构建与一小撮ACARS消息。我们将我们的调查结果与40位航空业专业人士对ACARS中隐私问题的意见联系起来。在此基础上，我们探讨了如何解决这些问题的建议，包括使用加密和政策措施。
Abstract Despite the Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) being widely deployed for over twenty years, little scrutiny has been applied to it outside of the aviation community. Whilst originally utilized by commercial airlines to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Such a change has caused ACARS to be used far beyond its original mandate; to date no work has been undertaken to assess the extent of this especially with regard to privacy and the various stakeholder groups which use it. In this paper, we present an analysis of ACARS usage by privacy sensitive actors-military, government and business. We conduct this using data from the VHF (both traditional ACARS, and VDL mode 2) and satellite communications subnetworks. Based on more than two million ACARS messages collected over the course of 16 months, we demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches location privacy for all examined aviation stakeholder groups, explaining the types of messages used to cause this problem.We illustrate the challenges with three case studies-one for each stakeholder group-to show how much privacy sensitive information can be constructed with a handful of ACARS messages. We contextualize our findings with opinions on the issue of privacy in ACARS from 40 aviation industry professionals. From this, we explore recommendations for how to address these issues, including use of encryption and policy measures.