Biosecurity and spread of an infectious animal disease
Biosecurity and spread of an infectious animal disease
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01088.x
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Hennessy, David A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hennessy, David A.
减少传染性动物疾病的流行是一项全球公益事业。这在一定程度上推动了公众参与传染性动物疾病控制的悠久传统。但设计得当的公共干预需要清楚地认识到私人激励的失败。传染病的两个重要特征是空间传播和可能采取代价高昂的私人行动来减少传播。此外，由于兽医当局核实种植者的常规生物安全行动通常成本高昂，因此自愿合规通常至关重要。为此，种植者必须认识到其行为的后果，并必须有足够的激励措施来采取社会所需的行动。本文的目的是提供一个更好的理解私人激励，以防止传染性动物疾病的传播。我们这样做，通过开发一个模型，强调在感染，预防技术和外部性代理人的回报空间关系。关于动物疾病的公共物品方面的经济学文献是有限的。事实上，关于人类传染病经济学的研究少得惊人（Gersovitz and Hammer 2004）。动物疾病一直是正式模型的主题（Chi et al. 2002），但通常解决的问题是内部成本，而不是农场之间的相互关系。一个密切相关的主题是控制入侵物种。关于这个问题的经济观点正在扩大，但主要局限于检疫（Mumford 2002）和其他公共行为，假定感染的外生随机动态过程（Olson和Roy 2002）。
Diminishing infectious animal disease prevalence amounts to a global public good. This has in part motivated the long tradition of public involvement in infectious animal disease control. But appropriately designed pub-lic intervention requires a clear understanding of failure in private incentives. Two important features of communicable disease are spatial spread and the possibility of costly private actions to reduce spread. In addition, since routine biosecurity actions by growers are typically costly to verify by veterinary authorities, voluntary compliance is often essential. To this end, growers must recognize the consequences of their actions and must have adequate incentives to take socially de-sirable actions. The intent of this article is to provide a better understanding of private in-centives to protect against the spread of infec-tious animal disease. We do so by developing a model that emphasizes spatial relations in in-fection, prevention technology, and externalities across agent payoffs. The economics literature on public goods aspects of animal diseases is limited. Indeed, a surprisingly small body of work exists on the economics of infectious human diseases (Gersovitz and Hammer 2004). Animal dis-eases have been the subject of formal models (Chi et al. 2002), but the issue generally ad-dressed is that of internal costs and not how farms inter-relate. A strongly related theme is that of controlling invasive species. Economic perspective on this issue is expanding, but has been confined largely to quarantine (Mumford 2002) and other public behaviors given an assumed exogenous stochastic dynamic process for infection (Olson and Roy 2002).