Pretty Good Phone Privacy
Pretty Good Phone Privacy
复制标题
相当好的电话隐私
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Raghavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paul Schmitt;B. Raghavan
当今蜂窝结构的一个基本特性-为了接收服务，电话向发射塔和运营商唯一地标识自己-现在是严重侵犯隐私的一个原因。在过去的两年里，运营商出售和泄露了数亿移动的用户的身份和位置数据，这一点已经变得很明显。
在本文中，我们研究如何提高隐私在现代移动的网络。我们对当今的蜂窝架构进行了端到端的分析，并找到了解耦的关键点，使新型运营商能够在不改变物理基础设施的情况下提供隐私增强服务，并且无需与现有运营商直接合作。
我们描述了相当好的电话隐私（PGPP），并演示了我们修改后的后端堆栈（EPC）如何与真实的电话提供普通但隐私保护的连接。我们探索固有的隐私和效率的权衡在一个大都市区的模拟。我们展示了PGPP如何保持今天的控制开销，同时显着提高用户身份和位置隐私。
A fundamental property of today's cellular architecture---in order to receive service, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators---is now a cause of major privacy violations. Over the past two years it has become clear that operators have sold and leaked identity and location data of hundreds of millions of mobile users.
In this paper, we examine how to improve privacy in modern mobile networks. We take an end-to-end perspective on today's cellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable a new type of operator to offer privacy-enhanced service with no changes to physical infrastructure and without direct cooperation from existing operators.
We describe Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP) and demonstrate how our modified backend stack (EPC) works with real phones to provide ordinary yet privacy-preserving connectivity. We explore inherent privacy and efficiency tradeoffs in a simulation of a large metropolitan region. We show how PGPP maintains today's control overheads while significantly improving user identity and location privacy.