Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables”
Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables”
复制标题
使用“未使用的可观察量”测试逆向选择
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Poterba
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Amy N. Finkelstein;J. Poterba
本文提出了一个新的测试在保险市场上的逆向选择的基础上，可观察到的特征，保险购买者，而不是在制定保险价格。当有可能发现一个或多个与被保险人的索赔经验和购买的保险数量相关的“未使用的可观察量”时，该测试拒绝对称信息的零假设。与以往的测试不对称信息，这个测试是不混淆的异质性，在个人偏好参数，如风险厌恶，影响保险需求。此外，它可以潜在地识别逆向选择的存在，而大多数替代测试无法区分逆向选择和道德风险。我们将此测试应用到一个新的数据集年金购买在英国，专注于年金的居住地作为一个“未使用的观察。”我们发现，社会经济地位的年金的居住地与年金购买和年金的预期死亡率。因此，不同社区的年金购买者面临不同的有效保险价格，他们会做出不同的选择。这与逆向选择的存在是一致的。我们的研究结果还提出了一些问题，即保险公司如何选择他们在设定保单价格时使用的买方属性。我们认为，政治经济的关注可能会在决定放弃使用一些信息，可以改善保险买家的风险分类中占据突出地位。JEL分类代码：D82，G22
This paper proposes a new test for adverse selection in insurance markets based on observable characteristics of insurance buyers that are not used in setting insurance prices. The test rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric information when it is possible to find one or more such “unused observables” that are correlated both with the claims experience of the insured and with the quantity of insurance purchased. Unlike previous tests for asymmetric information, this test is not confounded by heterogeneity in individual preference parameters, such as risk aversion, that affect insurance demand. Moreover, it can potentially identify the presence of adverse selection, while most alternative tests cannot distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard. We apply this test to a new data set on annuity purchases in the United Kingdom, focusing on the annuitant’s place of residence as an “unused observable.” We show that the socio-economic status of the annuitant’s place of residence is correlated both with annuity purchases and with the annuitant’s prospective mortality. Annuity buyers in different communities therefore face different effective insurance prices, and they make different choices accordingly. This is consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Our findings also raise questions about how insurance companies select the set of buyer attributes that they use in setting policy prices. We suggest that political economy concerns may figure prominently in decisions to forego the use of some information that could improve the risk classification of insurance buyers. JEL Classification Codes: D82, G22
影响因子：
8.4
作者：
Smith, JP
通讯作者：
Smith, JP