AN EXPLANATION OF "EMOTIONAL" PHENOMENA WITHOUT THE USE OF THE CONCEPT "EMOTION"
AN EXPLANATION OF "EMOTIONAL" PHENOMENA WITHOUT THE USE OF THE CONCEPT "EMOTION"
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DOI：
10.1080/00221309.1941.10544400
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发表时间：
1941-10-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Duffy, Elizabeth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Duffy, Elizabeth
多年来，笔者一直认为，“情感”作为一个科学概念，比无用更糟糕。1934年，在《心理评论》上发表的一篇文章中，她研究了心理学家对情绪的各种定义，得出的结论是，这些定义中没有一个成功地描述了一种不同于其他状态或反应模式的有机体状态或反应模式。“情感”显然并不代表一种单独的、可区分的状况。每一个旨在描述这种可区分的条件的定义都成功地描述了，不是反应种类的差异，而仅仅是反应的某些特征表现的程度的差异。也没有任何标准来确定某种特征的什么特定程度应该被称为”情感”，什么程度应该被称为”非情感“。相反，所描述的现象似乎发生在一个连续体中，或者更确切地说，发生在许多连续体中，因为行为的不止一个方面涉及到”情绪”的描述，并且没有迹象表明连续体上的哪些点代表了从”非情绪”到”情绪“的过渡。“情感”这个概念显然指的是某些反应连续体的极端，但它所暗示的不是这些现象的连续变化，而是”情感”和”非情感“之间的急剧断裂。事实上，“情感”应该遵循与“非情感”不同的行为原则。作者主张，应该放弃”情感”这个概念，而这个术语所指的现象应该作为连续发生的反应的独立方面而不是离散的类别来研究。
For many years the writer has been of the opinion that" emotion," as a scientific concept, is worse than useless. In 1934, in an article published in the Psychological Revie'W, she examined the various types of definition of emotion offered by psychologists and reached the conclusion that no one of these types of definition succeeded in describing a state or response pattern of the organism different in kind from other states or response patterns (3)." Emotion" apparently did not represent a separate and distinguishable condition. Each definition purporting to describe such a distinguishable condition succeeded in describing, not a difference in kind of response, but merely a difference in the degree to which certain characteristics of response were manifest. Nor was there any criterion by which to determine what particular degree of a certain characteristic should be called" emotion" and what degree should be called" non-emotion." Instead, the phenomena described appeared to occur in a continuum, or rather in a number of continua, since more than one aspect of behavior was involved in the description of" emotion," and there was no indication as to what points on the continua represented the transition from" non-emotion" to" emotion." The concept" emotion" apparently referred to the extremes of certain continua of response, but it implied, not continuous variation in these phenomena, but a sharp break between" emotion" and" non-emotion." In fact," emotion" was supposed to follow different principles· of action from" non-emotion." The writer contended that the concept" emotion" should be abandoned and the phenomena loosely referred to by this term should be studied in their own right as separate aspects of response occurring in continua rather than in discrete categories.