Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining
Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining
复制标题
外国直接投资和工资谈判
DOI：
10.1080/0963819032000049178
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Santoni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Naylor;M. Santoni
我们推导出两个工会企业之间的外国直接投资（FDI）博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡。我们发现，外国直接投资是不太可能的，在其他条件相同的情况下，更大的是工会讨价还价的力量和更多的替代是公司的产品在潜在的东道国。我们还研究了在何种条件下，企业间的FDI博弈将具有囚徒困境的特征。
We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played between two unionized firms. We show that FDI is less likely, ceteris paribus, the greater is union bargaining power and the more substitutable are the firms' products in the potential host country. We also examine the conditions under which the FDI game between firms will possess the characteristics of a Prisoners' Dilemma.