Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship? The "Authority Creep" Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration
Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship? The "Authority Creep" Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration
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新托管还是非托管？
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发表时间：
2008
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通讯作者：
C. Ford
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作者：
C. Ford
国家失败是对国际和平与安全的最大威胁之一。治理机构的崩溃会滋生内战，产生难民潮，造成巨大的平民苦难，引发邻国的不稳定，并为跨国犯罪和恐怖组织提供安全庇护所。因此，评论家和政策制定者越来越多地呼吁解决国家失灵问题。最令人信服的论据之一是借鉴一个古老的法律制度：联合国的国际托管。本文认为，虽然托管可能在管理国家失灵方面被证明是有效的，但它也带来了风险。国际干预通常对弱国的国内环境进行有限控制，但不会吸收其主权。相比之下，托管赋予临时国际管理人员巨大的权力和自由裁量权，而临时国际管理人员则倾向于集中权力和决策，以便在困难条件下完成具有挑战性的任务任务。这种“权力蠕变”吸收了主权，在此过程中可能会削弱失败国家领导人与联合国合作的动力。更糟糕的是，彻底的权力蠕变可能会削弱连续国际管理和重建努力的政治基础。本文最后概述了另一种选择*作者是加州大学伯克利分校国际问题研究所新时代外交政策中心研究员和加州大学伯克利分校政治学系博士生。他们要感谢 David D. Caron、Andrew T. Guzman、Bruce W. Jentleson、Matthew J. Lindsay、W. Michael Reisman 和 Steven Weber 的评论、批评和建议。作者特别感谢 Genevieve Lester、Sebastian Kaplan-Sears 和 Francesca Giovannini 在修订过程中提出的宝贵意见，并感谢 Giacomo Chiozza 和 Peter Bartu 提供的极好的建议。当然，所有错误或遗漏均由作者承担。 56 范德比尔特跨国法杂志 [卷。 41:55 联合国过渡行政当局的监督系统，作为保留部分主权权威和国内政治行为者控制的手段。
State failure poses one of the greatest threats to international peace and security. The collapse of governing institutions breeds civil wars, generates refugee flows, causes enormous civilian suffering, foments instability in neighboring countries, and provides safe havens for transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. As a result, commentators and policymakers have increasingly called for a remedy to the problem of state failure. One of the most compelling arguments is to draw on an old legal institution: international trusteeship by the United Nations (U.N.). This Article argues that while trusteeship may prove effective in managing state failure, it also carries risks. International interventions typically take limited control of the domestic environment of weak countries without absorbing their sovereignty. Trusteeship, in contrast, vests enormous authority and discretion in temporary international administrators, who in turn tend to centralize their power and decision-making in order to meet challenging mission mandates under difficult conditions. This “authority creep” absorbs sovereignty and in the process risks eroding incentives for leaders of failing states to cooperate with the U.N. Worse, unmitigated authority creep may weaken the political basis for successive international administration and reconstruction efforts. This Article concludes by outlining an alternative ∗ The authors are Research Fellows at the New Era Foreign Policy Center, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and doctoral students in the Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. They would like to thank David D. Caron, Andrew T. Guzman, Bruce W. Jentleson, Matthew J. Lindsay, W. Michael Reisman, and Steven Weber for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions. The authors extend special thanks to Genevieve Lester, Sebastian Kaplan-Sears, and Francesca Giovannini for their invaluable comments through the revising process, and to Giacomo Chiozza and Peter Bartu for their excellent advice. All errors or omissions, of course, remain with the authors. 56 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41:55 system of oversight for U.N. transitional administrators as a means of preserving partial sovereign authority and control for domestic political actors.