Optimal timing of acquisition price announcement for used products in a dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain
Optimal timing of acquisition price announcement for used products in a dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.010
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发表时间：
2022-03-08
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Matsui, Kenji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matsui, Kenji
信息技术的快速发展使回收公司能够通过传统和基于互联网的在线渠道从消费者那里购买和收集旧产品。由于在线渠道将价格信息即时传递给消费者，因此选择最佳时间宣布回收价格（即，收购价格）对消费者来说已经成为回收公司的关键问题。本文试图解决这个问题，通过发展一个博弈论模型描述的双渠道逆向供应链的回收公司和第三方收集，回收公司购买的产品不仅通过第三方收集，但也直接从消费者在线。我们通过求解模型得到两个主要结果。第一个是先动优势的出现，这意味着每个企业组成的双渠道逆向供应链应该宣布自己的回收价格之前，其他。第一个结果是值得注意的，因为它是完全相反的传统智慧，即后动优势的定价通常出现时，价格竞争发生在企业之间的水平关系，这是众所周知的非合作博弈论。第二个结果是，回收公司可以最大限度地提高自己的利润和消费者的剩余，通过宣布其在线渠道的回收价格之前或之后，而不是之后，确定转让价格支付给收集者的产品收集在离线渠道。研究结果可为双回收渠道逆向供应链管理提供决策指导。(C)2021作者由爱思唯尔公司出版
The rapid development of information technologies enables recycling companies to purchase and collect used products from consumers through both traditional and Internet-based online channels. Because an online channel transmits price information instantly to consumers, choosing the best time to announce the recycling price (i.e., acquisition price) of used products to consumers has become a critical problem for recycling companies. This paper seeks to solve this problem by developing a game-theoretic model describing a dual-channel reverse supply chain consisting of a recycling company and a third-party collector in which the recycling company purchases products not only through a third-party collector, but also directly from consumers online. We derive two major results by solving the model. The first is that first-mover advantage arises, which indicates that each firm constituting a dual-channel reverse supply chain should announce its own recycling price before the other. This first result is notable because it is exactly opposite to conventional wisdom that the second-mover advantage of pricing usually emerges when price competition occurs among firms in a horizontal relationship, which is well known in noncooperative game theory. The second result is that the recycling company can maximize its own profit and consumers' surplus by announcing its recycling price in the online channel before or upon, but not after, determining the transfer price paid to the collector for products collected in the offline channel. Both results can be used as practical decision-making guidelines in dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain management. (C) 2021The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.