Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees
Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees
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谁游说以及何时游说：欧洲议会委员会中利益集团战略的制度决定因素
DOI：
10.1177/1465116510382462
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
D. Marshall
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Marshall
本文解释了欧洲议会各委员会的制度条件如何影响游说者的战略行为。委员会的非正式组织和正式程序构成了立法影响力的分配和获得宣传的机会。它展示了影响力和隐含的游说活动是如何向有利于委员会精英的方向倾斜的。这里提供了新的证据，以突出公开修正案在委员会最终报告中发挥的重大影响。该理论还强调了信息质量在决定游说对象时所起的作用，并界定了游说者倾向于从友好的立法者那里获得支持的限度。对从94个结构化访谈中获得的数据进行了分析，并结合了委员会阶段投票结果的独特数据集。
This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.