Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices
Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices
复制标题
央行透明度和价格信号价值
DOI：
10.1353/eca.2006.0008
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Shin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Morris;H. Shin
货币政策的有效性取决于央行影响市场预期的能力。央行的透明度是实现这一目标的一种手段。然而，央行在影响市场预期方面越有效，市场结果反映央行自身对经济评估的可能性就越大。因此，市场价格在汇集分散的个体经济主体持有的信息方面的作用可能会受到损害。本文探讨了中央银行透明度所涉及的权衡，并将它们与关于在市场决策中过度重视公共信息以及提供更多公共信息的福利后果的辩论联系起来。
The effectiveness of monetary policy hinges on the central bank's ability to influence market expectations. Central bank transparency is a means toward this end. However, the more effective the central bank is at influencing the market's expectations, the greater is the potential for market outcomes to reflect the central bank's own assessment of the economy. The role of market prices in aggregating the information held by dispersed individual economic agents may thereby be impaired. This paper explores trade-offs involved in central bank transparency and relates them to the debates concerning the overweighting of public information in market decisions and the welfare consequences of greater provision of public information.