The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence
The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence
复制标题
中央银行独立性的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Haan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Eijffinger;J. Haan
人们常常认为，央行的高度独立性，加上央行以价格稳定为目标的明确授权，是维持这种稳定的重要制度手段。事实上，一些国家最近提高了中央银行的独立性，以加强它们对价格稳定的承诺。
It is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.