DYNAMIC MODELS OF SEGREGATION
DYNAMIC MODELS OF SEGREGATION
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DOI：
10.1080/0022250x.1971.9989794
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发表时间：
1971-01-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
SCHELLING, TC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
SCHELLING, TC
有些分离来自组织的实践，有些来自专门的沟通系统，有些来自与非随机变量的相关性;还有一些来自个人选择的相互作用。这是对歧视性个人选择的互动动态的抽象研究。一个模型是模拟，其中两个可识别的群体的个体成员分布在参考其自身位置定义的邻域中。第二个模型是分析的，处理分隔空间。最后一节将分析应用于“邻里小费”。系统性的影响被认为是压倒性的：没有简单的个人激励集体的结果。夸张的分离和模式化来自于运动的动力学。关于个人动机的推论通常不能从总体模式中得出。产生了密度和空位等一些意想不到的现象。一个关于“小费”的普遍理论开始出现。
Some segregation results from the practices of organizations, some from specialized communication systems, some from correlation with a variable that is non‐random; and some results from the interplay of individual choices. This is an abstract study of the interactive dynamics of discriminatory individual choices. One model is a simulation in which individual members of two recognizable groups distribute themselves in neighborhoods defined by reference to their own locations. A second model is analytic and deals with compartmented space. A final section applies the analytics to ‘neighborhood tipping.’ The systemic effects are found to be overwhelming: there is no simple correspondence of individual incentive to collective results. Exaggerated separation and patterning result from the dynamics of movement. Inferences about individual motives can usually not be drawn from aggregate patterns. Some unexpected phenomena, like density and vacancy, are generated. A general theory of ‘tipping’ begins to emerge.