Price Controls and the Behavior of the Firm
Price Controls and the Behavior of the Firm
复制标题
价格控制和企业行为
DOI：
10.2307/2526181
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发表时间：
1980
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael M. Murphy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michael M. Murphy
本文分析了当质量为变量时，价格控制对竞争厂商产量和效率的影响。人们早就认识到，价格控制将促使企业在不受管制的质量边际上进行沿着调整。然而，这一调整的全部后果尚未得到正式分析。本文的基础是在Leland [1977]的竞争质量选择综合理论中找到的。利兰的模型将消费者理论的“特征方法”，如兰开斯特[1966]、穆特[1966]和贝克尔[1965]所发展的，适用于企业理论。在本文中，我将利用利兰的模型来研究企业的调整，以约束其行为所施加的价格管制。在第二节中，我将提出一个竞争性企业的模型，其中产品质量是一个决策变量。第三节确定了价格控制对该公司的产量和产品质量的影响。价格管制对行业均衡的影响在第4节中得到了确认，并在第5节中得到了扩展，以考虑到管制导致的企业进入或退出。
This paper analyzes the impact of price controls upon the output and efficiency of the competitive firm when quality is a variable. It has long been recognized that price controls will induce firms to make adjustments along unregulated qualitative margins. The full consequences of this adjustment, however, have not been formally analyzed. The underpinnings of this paper are found in Leland's [1977] comprehensive theory of competitive quality choice. Leland's model adapts the "characteristics approach" of consumer theory, as developed by Lancaster [1966], Muth [1966], and Becker [1965], to the theory of the firm. In this paper, I shall utilize Leland's model to investigate the firm's adjustment to the constraint on its behavior imposed by a price control. In Section 2, 1 will set forth a model of a competitive firm for which product quality is a decision variable. Section 3 identifies the impact of price controls upon this firm's output and product quality. The effect of price controls on the industry equilibrium is identified in Section 4 and expanded in Section 5 to allow for entry or exit of firms as induced by the control.