ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T
ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T
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关于概率约定 T
DOI：
10.1017/s1755020308080167
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Leitgeb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Leitgeb
我们引入了一种真理认知理论，根据该理论，Tr(┌α┐) 和 α 被分配了相同的理性信念程度。结果表明，如果认知概率测度仅要求有限可加性（但不一定是 σ-可加性），那么即使对于包含自己的真值谓词的对象语言，这样的理论也是一致的。正如这一结果的证明所表明的那样，该理论也可以被解释为源自真理修正理论的定量版本。
We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(┌α┐) and α. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.