A methodological note on eliciting price forecasts in asset market experiments
A methodological note on eliciting price forecasts in asset market experiments
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
Nobuyuki Hanaki;E. Akiyama;Ryuichiro Ishikawa
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作者：
Nobuyuki Hanaki;E. Akiyama;Ryuichiro Ishikawa
We investigate (a) whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes, and (b) whether differences in the way subjects are incentivized to submit ''accurate'' price forecasts influence the market outcomes as well as the forecasts submitted by subjects in an experimental asset market. We consider three treatments: one without forecast elicitation (NF) and two with forecast elicitations. In one of the latter treatments, subjects are paid based on both their performance of forecasting and trading (Bonus), while in the other, they are paid based only on one of the two that is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment (Unique). While we found no statistical differences in terms of mispricing, trading volumes, and trading behavior between NF and Unique treatments, there were some statistically significant differences between NF and Bonus treatments. Thus, if the aim is to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and the market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts compared to NF treatment, then the Unique treatment seems to be better than the Bonus treatment.
