VeriGene: A Tool for the Creation of DNA Representations for Hardware Security Analysis
VeriGene: A Tool for the Creation of DNA Representations for Hardware Security Analysis
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DOI：
10.1109/paine56030.2022.10014765
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发表时间：
2022-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Haehn;Bayley King;R. Jha;T. Kebede;David Kapp
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文献类型：
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作者：
N. Haehn;Bayley King;R. Jha;T. Kebede;David Kapp
在没有新的分析方法的情况下，很难在设计中检测到硬件特洛伊木马(HT)或对电子电路的恶意攻击。存在自卫的生物学范例，为硬件特洛伊木马检测提供了可能的DNA基础。基因电路利用DNA结构在活细胞中实现可编程功能。用来产生基因电路的程序还处于初级阶段，需要相当长的时间，成功率有限。在这项研究中，我们提出了一种新的工具和方法来分析电子电路中的恶意攻击，采用DNA作为查看和分析硬件设计的基础。利用DNA信息的一般结构和编码为单个核苷酸和遗传电路的方法，我们描述了一个生成电路的DNA表示的程序。一旦用神经网络分析，来自感染和未感染电路的DNA表示被高精度地分类。这些结果为电路的硬件安全性分析和Verigene的可靠性提供了替代DNA透镜的证据。
Hardware Trojans (HT), or malicious attacks on electronic circuits, are difficult to detect within a design without novel analysis methods. Biological paradigms of self-defense exist, providing DNA as a possible basis for Hardware Trojan detection. Genetic circuits utilize DNA structures to allow programmable functions in living cells. The programs used to generate genetic circuits are in their infancy, taking considerable time with a limited success rate. In this study, we propose VeriGene a new tool and method for analyzing malicious attacks in electronic circuits, adapting DNA as a basis for viewing and analyzing hardware designs. Utilizing the general structure and encoding of DNA information into individual nucleotides and methods of genetic circuits, we describe a program to generate DNA representations of circuits. Once analyzed with a Neural Network, the DNA representations from infected and uninfected circuits were classified with high accuracy. The results provide evidence for an alternative DNA lens for the hardware security analysis of circuits and the reliability of the VeriGene.