Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts
Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts
复制标题
先行指标变量、绩效衡量以及长期合同与短期合同
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.414143
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Reichelstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Dutta;S. Reichelstein
本文建立了一个多时期代理模型来研究领先指标变量在管理绩效度量中的应用。除了熟悉的道德风险问题外，委托人还面临着激励经理进行“软”投资的任务。这些投资不是直接收缩的，但本金可以依赖于领先指标变量，这些指标变量提供了未来一段时间内将收到的投资回报的嘈杂预测。我们的分析将领先指标变量的作用与经理人激励合同的持续时间联系起来。对于短期合约而言，先行指标变量对于缓解“拖延”问题至关重要，这种“拖延”问题是由于投资在第一期结束时就已沉没。对于长期合同，如果经理的薪酬方案不随时间稳定，领先指标变量将是有价值的。然后，领先指标变量成为将未来投资回报与当前投资支出相匹配的工具。我们确定了与短期合同相比，最优长期合同诱导更大投资和更少依赖领先指标变量的条件。不过，在某些条件下，与长期合同相比，一系列的一期合同对委托人更有利。
This paper develops a multiperiod agency model to study the use of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake "soft" investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables which provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short-term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a "holdup" problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long-term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long-term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables in comparison to short-term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one-period contracts than with a long-term contract.