Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
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DOI：
10.1080/02691728.2013.782585
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发表时间：
2014-01-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Dotson, Kristie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dotson, Kristie
认知压迫是指持续的认知排斥，阻碍了一个人对知识生产的贡献。回避使用“认识性压迫”一词的倾向可能源于这样一种假设，即认识性形式的压迫通常可还原为社会和政治形式的压迫。虽然我同意，许多排斥，损害了一个人的能力，以促进知识的生产可以还原为社会和政治形式的压迫，仍然存在着明显的不可还原的形式的认识压迫。在本文中，我主张，可还原和不可还原的认识压迫之间的一个主要区别点是人们在处理每一种压迫时所面临的困难的主要来源，即认识论系统的认识力或特征。区分认识压迫的可简化和不可简化形式，可以更好地理解使用这个术语的利害关系，以及何时使用这个术语是恰当的。
Epistemic oppression refers to persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one's contribution to knowledge production. The tendency to shy away from using the term "epistemic oppression" may follow from an assumption that epistemic forms of oppression are generally reducible to social and political forms of oppression. While I agree that many exclusions that compromise one's ability to contribute to the production of knowledge can be reducible to social and political forms of oppression, there still exists distinctly irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. In this paper, I claim that a major point of distinction between reducible and irreducible epistemic oppression is the major source of difficulty one faces in addressing each kind of oppression, i.e. epistemic power or features of epistemological systems. Distinguishing between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression can offer a better understanding of what is at stake in deploying the term and when such deployment is apt.