Intra-Elite Competition and Long-Run Fiscal Development
Intra-Elite Competition and Long-Run Fiscal Development
复制标题
精英内部竞争与长期财政发展
作者：
P. Beramendi;M. Dincecco;Melissa Rogers
本文利用1870年至2010年30多个发达国家和发展中国家的原始数据库，首次对精英内部竞争的历史水平与财政发展之间的长期关系进行了实证分析。我们认为，工业化的时机影响农业和资本主义精英之间的历史竞争的程度，这反过来又有助于形成关键的财政规模和结构的初始决策。在“早期”工业化中，精英内部的竞争往往更激烈，促进了以高税收和税收累进为特点的财政发展。相比之下，在“晚期”工业化中，农业精英更有可能保持政治主导地位，促进以低总体税收和税收递减为特征的财政国家。我们的证据表明，历史上的精英内部竞争水平和长期的财政发展之间存在积极的，统计上显着的，和强大的关系。这种对精英内部竞争的关注提高了我们对当今跨国财政差异的基本决定因素的理解。
This paper exploits an original database that spans 30-plus developed and developing nations between 1870 and 2010 to perform the first empirical analysis of the relationship between historical levels of intra-elite competition and fiscal development over the long run. We argue that the timing of industrialization affects the extent of historical competition between agricultural and capitalist elites, which in turn helps shape key initial decisions over fiscal size and structure. Under “early” industrialization, intra-elite competition levels tended to be greater, promoting fiscal development characterized by high overall taxation and tax progressivity. Under “late” industrialization, by contrast, agricultural elites were more likely to retain political dominance, promoting fiscal states characterized by low overall taxation and tax regressivity. We show evidence for a positive, statistically significant, and robust relationship between historical intra-elite competition levels and long-run fiscal development. This focus on intra-elite competition improves our understanding of the fundamental determinants of cross-national fiscal differences today.
民主化
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
Inglehart
通讯作者：
Inglehart
税务员准备好工具：个人所得税开征的事件历史研究
影响因子：
9.8
作者：
Aidt T
通讯作者：
Aidt T