Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion
Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion
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叛乱领导人、内部竞争对手和外部资源：国家支持者如何影响叛乱分子的凝聚力
DOI：
10.1093/isq/sqw033
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Henning Tamm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Henning Tamm
内战的特点往往是叛乱团体与外部赞助者。然而，我们对这种赞助对叛乱分子凝聚力的影响知之甚少。事实上，研究人员对国家赞助鼓励或阻止组织分裂的条件存在分歧。本文提出了一个理论，调和这些分歧。我专注于外部资源的分配如何影响集团内部的权力分配之间的反叛领导人和他们的内部竞争对手。支持者帮助维持有利于领导者的权力不平衡，促进凝聚力;那些帮助扭转有利于竞争对手的不平衡的人增加了集团内部政变的可能性。只有当赞助者促成权力从不平衡向平衡的转变时，反叛组织才更有可能分裂成相互竞争的组织。我进一步认为，赞助商重新分配他们的资源，有利于叛军领导人的内部竞争对手，以惩罚领导人不受欢迎的行为。对两个主要叛乱团体-苏丹人民解放运动/解放军和黎巴嫩真主党-的案例研究说明了我的论点的解释力。
Civil wars often feature insurgent groups with external sponsors. Yet, we know little about the impact of such sponsorship on insurgent cohesion. Indeed, researchers disagree about the conditions under which state sponsorship encourages or discourages organizational splits. This article presents a theory that reconciles these disagreements. I focus on how the allocation of external resources affects the intra-group distribution of power between rebel leaders and their internal rivals. Sponsors that help maintain an imbalance of power in favor of the leader foster cohesion; those that help flip the imbalance in favor of a rival increase the likelihood of an internal coup within the group. Only when sponsors contribute to a shift from an imbalance of power to balanced power is the rebel group more likely to split into competing organizations. I further argue that sponsors reallocate their resources in favor of a rebel leader’s internal rival in order to punish the leader for undesired behavior. Case studies of two major insurgent groups—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Lebanese Hezbollah—illustrate the explanatory power of my argument.