Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation
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谁制定了敌意收购规则？为什么？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Skeel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Armour;D. Skeel
在“英美”公司治理制度中，敌意收购通常被认为在使管理人员对分散的股东负责方面发挥了关键作用。然而，令人惊讶的是，很少有人注意到这两个最主要的司法管辖区在收购监管方面的巨大差异。在英国，目标管理者的防御策略是被禁止的，而特拉华州的法律给了美国管理者很大的回旋余地。关于这种差异的现有解释集中在美国竞争性联邦制的所谓病态上。相反，我们专注于“供给方”的规则生产，从公共选择的角度来研究这两种制度的演变。我们认为，规则的内容受到监管模式差异的重要影响。在英国，收购的自我监管导致了一个主要由机构投资者利益驱动的制度，而美国司法立法的动态使股东相对难以影响规则，从而使管理者受益。此外，华尔街永远不可能像伦敦金融城那样将收购“私有化”，因为20世纪30年代的美国联邦监管既抢先于自我监管，又限制了机构投资者的协调能力。
Hostile takeovers are commonly thought to play a key role in rendering managers accountable to dispersed shareholders in the "Anglo-American" system of corporate governance. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the very significant differences in takeover regulation between the two most prominent jurisdictions. In the UK, defensive tactics by target managers are prohibited, whereas Delaware law gives US managers a good deal of room to maneuver. Existing accounts of this difference focus on alleged pathologies in competitive federalism in the US. In contrast, we focus on the "supply-side" of rule production, by examining the evolution of the two regimes from a public choice perspective. We suggest that the content of the rules has been crucially influenced by differences in the mode of regulation. In the UK, self-regulation of takeovers has led to a regime largely driven by the interests of institutional investors, whereas the dynamics of judicial law-making in the US have benefited managers by making it relatively difficult for shareholders to influence the rules. Moreover, it was never possible for Wall Street to "privatize" takeovers in the same way as the City of London, because US federal regulation in the 1930s both pre-empted self-regulation and restricted the ability of institutional investors to coordinate.