Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics
Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics
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政治经济学前奏：经济学的社会和政治基础研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Basu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Basu
主流经济学建立在许多强有力的假设基础之上。制度和政治被视为无关紧要，政府被当作外生变量，社会规范被看作附带现象。作为一种初步策略，这是可行的。但随着经济研究的视野不断拓宽，这些假设已成为阻碍而非助力。如果我们想理解为什么一些经济体成功而一些失败，为什么一些政府有效而另一些无效，为什么一些社区繁荣而另一些停滞不前，就必须将经济学视为嵌入政治和社会之中。《政治经济学序曲》就是对这种嵌入性的研究；它主张对制度和国家采取一种“包容性”方法。现代经济学认识到，个人对自身私利的追求可能导致社会次优结果——囚徒困境就是一个鲜明的例子。有人提出，在这种情况下我们需要的是“第三方”干预，其形式可以是对参与者施加惩罚。考希克·巴苏反对这种凭空设想第三方的方法。他认为，如果存在一个能够将其意志强加于他人的第三方，那么一开始就应该将其建模为一个参与者。采用这种包容性方法对我们关于国家和法律的概念有影响。这意味着法律不能被理解为改变公民所参与博弈的一个因素。相反，它仅仅是公民的一组信念；就此而言，它与社会规范类似。法律对经济所起的作用，社会规范也能起到。本书讨论了政策建议的性质以及我们对国家权力的概念如何受到这种对国家和法律的改变后的观点的影响。作为推论，本书探讨了一系列重要的社会和哲学问题，比如国家是否应该保障言论自由，决定论是否与自由意志相容，以及自由市场是否会导致强制。可在牛津学术在线获取：http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0198296711/toc.html
Mainstream economics was founded on many strong assumptions. Institutions and politics were treated as irrelevant, government as exogenous, social norms as epiphenomena. As an initial gambit this was fine. But as the horizons of economic inquiry have broadened, these assumptions have become hindrances rather than aids. If we want to understand why some economies succeed and some fail, why some governments are effective and others not, why some communities prosper while others stagnate, it is essential to view economics as embedded in politics and society. Prelude to Political Economy is a study of this embeddedness; it argues for an 'inclusive' approach to institutions and the state. Modern economics recognizes that individuals' pursuit of their own selfish ends can result in socially suboptimal outcomes - the Prisoner's Dilemma being the stark example. It has been suggested that what we need in such an eventuality is 'third-party' intervention, which can take the form of imposing punishment on players. Kaushik Basu objects to this method of wishing third parties out of thin air. He argues that if a third party that could impose its will on others were available, then it should have been modeled as a player to start with. The adoption of such an inclusive approach has implications for our conception of the state and the law. It means that the law cannot be construed as a factor that changes the game that citizens play. It is instead simply a set of beliefs of citizens; and, as such, it is similar to social norms. What the law does for an economy, so can social norms. The book discusses how the nature of policy advice and our conception of state power are affected by this altered view of the state and the law. As corollaries, the book addresses a variety of important social and philosophical questions, such as whether the state should guarantee freedom of speech, whether determinism is compatible with free will, and whether the free market can lead to coercion. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0198296711/toc.html