Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
复制标题
通过公布价格最小化完工时间
DOI:
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
A. Roytman
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
M. Feldman;A. Fiat;A. Roytman
We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which corresponds to the completion time of the last job to complete. The incentives of the selfish jobs may lead to poor performance. To reconcile the differing objectives, we introduce posted machine prices. The selfish job seeks to minimize the sum of its completion time on the machine and the posted price for the machine. Prices may be static (i.e., set once and for all before any arrival) or dynamic (i.e., change over time), but they are determined only by the past, assuming nothing about upcoming events. Obviously, such schemes are inherently truthful. We consider the competitive ratio: the ratio between the makespan achievable by the pricing scheme and that of the optimal algorithm. We give tight bounds on the competitive ratio for both dynamic and static pricing schemes for identical, restricted, related, and unrelated machine settings. Our main result is a dynamic pricing scheme for related machines that gives a constant competitive ratio, essentially matching the competitive ratio of online algorithms for this setting. In contrast, dynamic pricing gives poor performance for unrelated machines. This lower bound also exhibits a gap between what can be achieved by pricing versus what can be achieved by online algorithms.
DOI:
10.1109/focs.2015.39
发表时间:
2014-11
期刊:
2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
影响因子:
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作者:
Sungjin Im;Nathaniel Kell;Janardhan Kulkarni;Debmalya Panigrahi
通讯作者:
Sungjin Im;Nathaniel Kell;Janardhan Kulkarni;Debmalya Panigrahi