Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.891482
复制
发表时间：
2007-02
影响因子：
5.6
通讯作者：
I. Dyck;Adair Morse;Luigi Zingales
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Dyck;Adair Morse;Luigi Zingales
什么外部控制机制在发现公司欺诈方面最有效？为了解决这个问题，我们深入研究了1996年至2004年期间资产超过7.5亿美元的公司中所有报告的公司欺诈案件。我们发现，欺诈检测并不依赖于一个单一的机制，但在广泛的，往往是不可能的，演员。只有6%的欺诈行为是由SEC披露的，14%是由审计师披露的。更重要的监督者是媒体（14%）、行业监管机构（16%）和员工（19%）。在SOX之前，只有35%的案例是由有明确授权的参与者发现的。在SOX之后，授权参与者的表现有所改善，但仍然只占案件的50%多一点。我们发现，在不增加琐碎诉讼的情况下，对政府欺诈行为进行检测的金钱激励会影响检测，这表明将这种激励措施更普遍地扩展到企业欺诈行为会带来好处。
What external control mechanisms are most effective in detecting corporate fraud? To address this question we study in depth all reported cases of corporate fraud in companies with more than 750 million dollars in assets between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on one single mechanism, but on a wide range of, often improbable, actors. Only 6% of the frauds are revealed by the SEC and 14% by the auditors. More important monitors are media (14%), industry regulators (16%), and employees (19%). Before SOX, only 35% of the cases were discovered by actors with an explicit mandate. After SOX, the performance of mandated actors improved, but still account for only slightly more than 50% of the cases. We find that monetary incentives for detection in frauds against the government influence detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting gains from extending such incentives to corporate fraud more generally.