To Invest or Insure?
To Invest or Insure?
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投资还是保险？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joseph G Wright
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joseph G Wright
在这篇文章中，作者认为，一个独裁者所面临的时间跨度会从三个方面影响他使用援助的动机。首先，当独裁者的时间跨度较长时，他们有更大的动机投资于公共产品。其次，短期独裁者经常面临挑战者的威胁;这导致他们放弃投资，转而以两种损害增长的形式消耗国家资源：镇压和对政治对手的私人贿赂。第三，短期内的独裁者有强烈的动机来确保个人财富，作为政权福尔斯垮台时的一种保险形式。作者利用1961年至2001年71个发展中国家独裁者的面板数据，发现时间跨度对援助有效性有积极影响：当独裁者面临长时间跨度时，对外援助与正增长相关，而当时间跨度较短时，对外援助与负增长相关。
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways. First, dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon. Second, dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime; this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth: repression and private pay-offs to political opponents. Third, dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls. Using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001, the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness: Foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short.