The Effects of Uncertain Divestiture as Regulatory Threat
The Effects of Uncertain Divestiture as Regulatory Threat
复制标题
不确定性剥离作为监管威胁的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-010-0089-7
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tanaka;M.
有人认为，监管干预的威胁会影响公司的行为。我们研究了在监管威胁下，市场干预的概率与价格的函数关系，并分析了主导厂商的定价决策。我们的重点是公司的潜在剥离作为监管干预的威胁的情况下。它表明，在一定的条件下与边际预期罚款，仅仅威胁剥离公司的制造工厂的某一部分，导致一个较低的价格比实际剥离的同一部分。数值例子表明，相对较小规模的剥离，该公司的威胁下的价格可能低于实际剥离下，在一个相对广泛的监管机构的干预态度。
It has been argued that the threat of regulatory intervention affects firm behavior. We investigate the pricing decision of the dominant firm under regulatory threat, considering the probability of intervention as a function of the price. Our focus is on the case where the potential divestiture of the firm serves as a threat of regulatory intervention. It is shown that under certain conditions associated with the marginal expected penalty, the mere threat of divesting a certain portion of the firm’s manufacturing plants leads to a lower price than the actual divestiture of that same portion. Numerical examples illustrate that with relatively small-scale divestiture, the firm’s price under the threat may be lower than that under the actual divestiture, within a relatively broad range of regulator’s attitudes toward intervention.