Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00513.x
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发表时间：
2003-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
我们研究了折扣因子小于但接近于统一的二人无限重复博弈。监控是私密的，玩家无法交流。我们对球员监控技术的准确性没有任何条件要求。我们给出了条件独立囚徒困境的民间定理。我们还研究了更一般的游戏，其中玩家的私人信号仅通过不可观察的宏观冲击相关。我们证明了当私有信号集的大小足够大时，一般私有信号结构的效率是可持续的。最后，我们证明了在价格设定的双寡头垄断中，卡特尔勾结是可持续的。
We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology. We show the folk theorem for the prisoners' dilemma with conditional independence. We also investigate more general games where players' private signals are correlated only through an unobservable macro shock. We show that efficiency is sustainable for generic private signal structures when the size of the set of private signals is sufficiently large. Finally, we show that cartel collusion is sustainable in price-setting duopoly.