On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach
On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach
复制标题
DOI：
10.2307/1885724
复制
发表时间：
1981-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Shavell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Shavell
研究了不确定性对合同设计和违约补救措施的影响。在描述完全或有合同的特征之后，检查不完全合同。具体而言，针对或有准备金的计提困难（列举成本、讨价还价的成本、事件发生的核实等），显示了哪些或有准备金的计提。然后，在论文的主要部分，分析了条件项的两个重要的隐式替代。第一个是违约救济；因为当一方必须支付违约赔偿金时，他将被诱导履行其在详细合同条款下商定的意外事件中的义务。或有条款的第二个替代是根据情况重新谈判的机会，因为重新谈判或多或少会发生在合同条款根据更详细的协议而有所不同的意外情况中。
The implications of uncertainty for the design of contracts and of remedies for their breach are studied. After characterizing complete contingent contracts, incomplete contracts are examined. Specifically, in view of difficulties in making contingent provisions (costs of enumeration and of bargaining; verification of occurrence of events), it is shown for which contingencies provisions are made. Then, in the major part of the paper, two important implicit substitute for contingent terms are analyzed. The first is provided by remedies for breach of contract; for when a party must pay damages for breach, he will be induced to fulfill his obligations in approximately those contingencies which would have been agreed upon under the terms of a detailed contract. The second substitute for contingent terms lies in the opportunity for renegotiation in light of circumstances, since renegotiation will occur in more or less those contingencies where the contract terms would have differed under a more detailed agreement.