Bank equity ownership and corporate hedging: Evidence from Japan
Bank equity ownership and corporate hedging: Evidence from Japan
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.07.001
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发表时间：
2019-10
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
P. Limpaphayom;D. A. Rogers;Noriyoshi Yanase
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Limpaphayom;D. A. Rogers;Noriyoshi Yanase
本研究探讨了日本银行股权与企业对冲之间的关系，在日本，银行被允许在一定限度内持有其借出资金的公司的股票。研究结果表明，银行股权与企业衍生品使用呈正相关。我们还发现很少有证据表明公司层面的财务约束会影响衍生品的使用。我们进一步分析衍生品使用与公司价值之间的关系，以评估衍生品使用是否是由银行寻租或投机行为驱动的。我们发现衍生品的使用与公司价值呈正相关，这支持了银行股权增加企业对冲的观点，进而导致公司估值较高。稳健性检验表明，对冲与主要银行股权之间的关系并非由内生性驱动。最后，我们的研究结果表明，企业对冲是由银行监控产生的风险规避激励驱动的。我们的结论是，除了相关经济因素外，股权结构也会影响企业的套期保值行为。
This study examines the relation between bank equity ownership and corporate hedging in Japan, an economy where banks are allowed, to a certain limit, to hold shares of firms to which they lend funds. The results show that bank equity ownership is positively related to the corporate usage of derivatives. We also find very little evidence that firm-level financial constraints affect derivatives usage. We further analyze the relation between derivatives usage and firm value to assess whether derivatives usage is driven by bank rent-seeking or speculative behavior. We find that derivatives usage is positively related to firm value providing support to the notion that bank equity ownership increases corporate hedging which, in turn, leads to high firm valuation. Robustness tests show that the relation between hedging and main bank equity ownership is not driven by endogeneity. In the end, our findings suggest that corporate hedging is driven by risk-averse incentives resulting from bank monitoring. We conclude that, in addition to relevant economic factors, ownership structure can also affect corporate hedging behavior.